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Fernando Estrada 
Abstract 
This article proposes a reading of the armed conflict from an evolutionary design 
that takes into account the concept of private protection agencies in the works of 
Schelling. Their aim is to assess the dynamics of conflict and changes from its 
author's scientific output. A context of conflicts that includes new expressions of 
violence and the relative failure of the paramilitary reintegration involves using 
new analytical models (argumentation, game theory and inconsistent information). 
The recent evolution of emerging gangs and their expansion into areas that were 
paramilitary camps requires monitoring not only of the government and the 
authorities, but those investigating the conflict in the present tense. The author 
provides heuristic research support from Schelling’s theory of strategy, recent 
contributions to the relationship between organized crime and drug cartels. 
Keyword: Colombia, Government, Civil War, Latin America, Security, Protection 
Agencies. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
According to Schelling1, conflict theories can be classified into those that see 
the conflict as a pathological state and study its’ causes and treatment, and 
those that accept the conflict as a fact and analyse the behaviour which 
arises out of it.  This last category is then divided into those theories that 
comprehensively analyse, in its full complexity, all those that participate in 
a conflict (rational and irrational conduct, calculi and motivations), and 
those theories that consider the actors that act rationally in a conflict 
(competition, generalised beneficial end and means of achieving this end). 
 
                                                          
1 Like few authors, Thomas C. Shelling (1960) has managed to propose an original strategy theory 
that, due to its simplicity, has overcome the complex formulation of the conventional game theory 
(Newman/Nash). Recently Schelling has highlighted the historical and geographical circumstances 
which led to the formation of his model, please see: Jean-Paul Carvalh, “An interview with Thomas 
Schelling”, Oxonomics 2 (2007) 1 – 8. The graphic diagram that we use is also valid (with small 
differences) according to Nozick, 1974 and Gambetta, 1993. 
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The latter category is known as conflict strategy.  This article will explore 
Schelling’s notion of conflict strategy with relation to the Colombian conflict 
for three reasons: a) as analysts ourselves, we are taking a position in the 
conflict; therefore, we want to know for what reasons the actors rationally 
perpetrate violence; b) we have an interest in understanding what types of 
changes and phenomena the principal actors experience; c) it is possible that 
we have a certain degree of influence (direct and indirect) over the 
behaviour and the social representations that spring from the conflict, and 
for that reason, it is important to understand the variables which restrict 
possible action. 
 
Rational conduct is the fundamental factor to be considered in this article.  
Indeed, Schelling’s diagram suggests that conflict strategy can be 
understood by analysing various characteristics of rational behaviour: the 
micro behaviour of an individual, the miso behaviour of a soldier within an 
armed group or macro behaviour of the armed group in general.  Individuals 
actions’ are motivated by incentives that can be quantified, ranging from 
basic salary, bonuses and awards for successful operations, to goods 
collected for threat, extortion and blackmail. These explanatory elements 
can by used to construct a coherent account of the rationality for joining one 
of the armed forces (as observed the individual’s motivation may not be 
violent).  In any case, motivation to act is not considered in moral terms 
when analysing the complex structure of rationality.  
 
Limiting conflict studies to strategy theory reduces the understanding of 
field of action solely to rational conduct (as opposed to irrational conduct 
motivated by passion); which is to say, not only to intelligent conduct, but 
also to conduct motivated by a utilitarian calculation of advantages and 
inconveniences.  Within an armed group this is based on a coherent system 
of values, such as obedience, the benefits of lying, punishment, incentives 
etc. This limited perspective has its advantages: it allows for the 
development of a theory of conflict strategy based on rational choice.  
 
Assuming the existence of the conflict and contending that each armed actor 
has to “win” does not necessarily imply that the actors´ interests are in 
opposition. Only in a theoretic case of a pure conflict are the interests of the 
antagonists in complete opposition and the goal is total extermination of the 
adversary.  However, coalitions of otherwise enemy armed forces may form 
to access economic resources, control drugs production and the main 
transportation routes, protect the population to gain local support, 
negotiate, etc.  As such, competing actors have a common interest.  This is 
especially the case in Colombia where there are a plethora of armed groups 
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competing in a diverse geographic landscape. Therefore, gains in the 
language of a conflict do not necessarily translate into gains with respect to 
the adversary, but gains with respect to one of the systems of values (micro, 
miso and macro).  Within the context of a conflict, there must always exist 
the possibility of a solution.  The possibility of a solution and the common 
interests between the various armed factions creates a mutual inter-
dependence. This mutual inter-dependence allows for a diverse range of 
tactics, such as intimidation, threat, disarmament and negotiation, which 
continually change the dynamics of the conflict, specific to time and 
territory.   
 
The mutual inter-dependence has a psychological element.  In one region 
some armed factions may be friends, in another they may be foes, but in 
either case the various groups will never have comprehensive information 
concerning the others.  For example, they will not know the quantity and 
quality of their arms, their territorial control, their resources or the size of 
their cultivations.  Much of the information that they do receive is based on 
rumour.  The asymmetric and incomplete information provides breeding 
ground for psychological warfare.  Strategy does not have to refer to the use 
of force, but to what Schelling denominates: “the exploitation of potential 
force”.  Due to the lack of information concerning the other armed groups, a 
threatened group to some extent can only hazard a guess at whether a 
threat can actually be followed through.  This strategy affects both the 
enemy and those who form part of the alliance because the aim of the 
strategy is to deliver a solution that is mutually beneficial for all the 
participants, whether that be negatively avoiding harm or positively gaining 
a benefit.  
 
In terms of the game theory, the most interesting conflicts are not those 
which add up to zero, for example in the Cold War where the enemy forces 
knew that they had equal and opposite power in the form of nuclear 
weapons which resulted in a strategic tie, but those in which the competing 
factions have asymmetric and incomplete information concerning the other, 
and in which one side does not have to win, but both groups can 
simultaneously gain from a conflict through their common interests. In this 
study, the exploitation of potential force is understood to compare how 
strategies are developed within an organisation (rationality, inter-
dependence, friend-enemy, and means of achieving an end) and how 
competitive strategies (threat, intimidation, extortion, fines and taxes) 
between different groups are developed, in key territories. 
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Threatening the opposition is an important strategy. The use and style of 
threats has been developed in such a way that it now delivers profitable 
results.  Time has taught that for a threat to be successful then it must be 
believable, and its credibility depends on the implied risks and actions to be 
complied with by the threatening party. As such, the efficiency of the threat 
depends on the rationale of the adversary.  For example, the threat of mass 
destruction can only intimidate an enemy if first, that enemy believes that 
those threatening them have the capacity to mass destruct, and second, that 
there equally exists a possibility not to destruct.  In the case of Colombia, 
the threatening party must be able to take preventative measures to stop 
the confrontations from escalating. Agreements between the government 
and the paramilitaries have intended to limit the capacity of the FARC and 
the ELN to threat and extort2.  
 
The process through which the idea of conflict strategy has been developed 
has been considerable slow. The existent theory is very vague and there is 
little literature that applies the theory to the case study of Colombia.  
Methodology has not been developed concerning the use of threat and the 
related literature does not provide possible solutions to the immediate 
problems.  Why has there been a lack of theoretical development?  The 
answer lies in the fact that the military services, in contrast to almost all 
other important professions, lack an identifiable academic counterpart.  
Both the military and the interest groups fail to recognise the relevance of 
the problem.  
 
What would a theory concerning conflict strategy in Colombia address?  
Which questions would it try to answer? Which ideas would it try to group 
together, clarify or communicate in a more effective manner? To start with, 
it would have to identify the key elements of the conflict and create a 
typology of the various conducts employed by the armed parties (for example 
the government and the para-state groups).  The objective of strategy is to 
influence the actions of an adversary and to induce a desired behaviour, but 
what system of values provides for the credibility of a threat?  All of these 
questions demonstrate that there is sufficient material to create a theory 
that would help to give greater understanding of the Colombian conflict.  
This paper will try to answer these questions and will integrate various 
                                                          
2 We presented a preliminary paper concerning the roll of indirect communications in typical cases 
of threat and bribery to the First Congress of Political Science, Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, 
Noviembre de 2008, (Estrada Gallego, Fernando, El Soborno y la Amenaza en las Guerras Civiles, La 
Universidad de la Valle, Departamento de Economia, Cali, Colombia, 2008) 
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perspectives into the analysis, such as the game theory, inconsistent 
information, argument analysis and collective decision-making.  
 
According to the Conventional Game Theory, violence perpetrated in an 
armed conflict is rationally or irrationally motivated. Some orthodox writers 
believe it is exclusively one or the other. However, it is dogmatic to sustain 
that violence is only rationally motivated because there is no optimal level of 
rationality used for applying violence. Likewise, violence cannot only be 
motivated by passion because enemies will rationalise the best means of 
achieving benefits, such as drugs production, and this may involve an 
alliance with otherwise enemy forces. Lets say for example that soldier A is 
threatening the family of an enemy soldier B.  B may pay soldier A not to 
harm his family out of fear, which is a passion, or because he rationally 
deduces that A always follows through with his threats. A more nuanced 
understanding of strategy contends that violence is both rationally and 
irrationally motivated, that which Schelling names an inter-dependent 
decision theory. There is psychological dependence between the various 
groups, and their actions towards each other are both rational and 
irrational. For example, the para-state groups use dates and facts, 
information and estimations concerning the enemy to strategise and the 
government uses expected behavioural patterns attributed to insurgents, 
paramilitaries and organized criminals.  
 
The assumption that, during a conflict, strategic decisions are made using a 
rational framework, implicitly affirms a rational utilitarian theory of action. 
Many of the critical elements than are integrated into the model of rational 
conduct can be typified as rational or irrational.  This premise obliges us to 
consider what irrationality means. Irrationality is defined as an incoherent 
and disordered system of values that may lead to miscalculations. 
Information systems, collective decision-making or the parameters by which 
the possibilities of error are represented or loss of control can be considered 
as an intent to formalize the study of irrationality.  
 
The apparent limitations that are imposed by starting from this premise of 
rationality are revealed by two observations: (a) an otherwise unstable or 
irrational enemy can often be intuitively understood as strategic; and (b) an 
explicit theory that considers rational decision-making and its strategic 
consequences unequivocally demonstrates that acting rationally does not 
necessarily constitute a universal advantage in conflict situations. Many of 
the factors of rationality suppose adverse factors in certain strategic 
situations, that is to say, it can be rational not to be rational. Additionally, 
there are defences that in strategy theory could be seen as deteriorations of 
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rationality. This also demonstrates that in the face of a threat, it is not 
always advantageous to have an efficient system of communication, to have 
complete information regarding the adversary or to find oneself in the 
position of power to provide all and freely from one’s own goods. 
 
To resume, the focus taken in this article that addresses conflict strategy is 
an analytic extension of Thomas C. Schelling’s work (1960).  The strategy 
theory is conceived in relation to mutual inter-dependence. In a conflict, the 
behaviour of soldiers that compete for control of zones and territories with 
economic benefits is regarded as sufficiently rational (Collier/Skaperdas).  In 
this article, the strategy is related to incentives and motivations: money, 
salaries, drugs, arms, women etc.  The geography of the country reduces 
local populations to military or political objectives by the principal agents of 
the conflict.  Also the strategy follows patterns of logic in terms of 
communication and violent discourse.  Information exchanged during a war, 
including the use of arms, the communication of motives given for an attack 
or a defence, is significantly strategic (Lakoff).   
 
 
CONTEXT  
Analysing the Colombian conflict calls for a certain degree of commitment 
on the part of the researchers.  This occasionally creating a danger for them: 
too much curiosity kills.  One persistent research problem is that when 
explaining the way that the para-state organisations operate, normally only 
inchoate information can be found.  However, with the consolidation of the 
nexus between national organisms and international institutions, more 
valuable information has been uncovered regarding the mechanisms they 
employed.  The confessions of the head drugs traffickers and evidence 
divulged in the prosecutions against members of criminal organisations in 
the trials lead by the attorney general also provide us with leads3.  
It is possible to work from information collected from official judicial reports 
of the paramilitary and drugs trafficking trials.  The accused is rewarded 
with benefits for declaring their illegal activities, crimes and the massacres 
                                                          
3 Research problems regarding sources and quality of information of civil wars have presented a 
fundamental difficulty for various reasons: first, because an unbiast researcher will not have 
sufficient information to analyse the principal perpetrators.  Second, factual information is always 
discovered ex post, after the events have occurred; therefore, motives, causes and circumstances 
are reconstructed in accordance with the narrative and interests in hand.   Thorough research 
always should consist in a scrupously diverse range of sources and reliable testimonies. See: 
(Estrada, 2007a). 
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that they have participated in.  These confessions are valuable for our 
analysis.  Jorge 40, Mancuso, and Don Diego, all prosecuted in the United 
States under charges of drugs trafficking, gave details in their confessions 
that paint a more complete picture of their individual front’s activities and 
paramilitary strategy employed over the last few decades.  
Generally, the sources used in recent research what are predominantly 
descriptive in character.  However, in our case we have opted for using 
research initiated a decade ago, consisting in a referential mark based on 
argumentation theory, non-cooperative games and asymmetrical 
information.  When argumentation techniques and rational structures are 
used to explain violence, it is demonstrated that the para-state 
organisations operated by forming coalitions in strategic territories for 
drugs production and trafficking.  The aim of this project is to advance 
research of these new strands of the conflict4. 
An aspect of the armed conflict which we focused our reserach on was the 
reconstruction of the phenomena of rumors. Kowalski’s and Strojnowsk’s 
graphic models show that the location of threatened populations can be used 
to explain spacial ties between the armed actors and the expansion of 
information (Estrada, 2007ª).  Using their models, the network of 
information can be visualised as a natural, progressive and non-lineal 
expansion.  The information spreads through a sequence of cuasal 
relationships and disperses in accordance with the force of individual and 
collective beliefs in a particular social network.  
The relationship between information and snitching, prima facie, falls into 
the domain of rumours.  Often people are quick to tell on their neighbours so 
as to obtain benefits or protection and security.  The accusations take on 
various forms, one of these being rumour (“they say that”, “some people are 
saying”, “its been said that”). The character of a rumour allows for little 
alterations or discrepancies to be made as it passes from ear to ear.  The 
consequences, even on a global scale, can be regrettable.   The rumours are 
                                                          
4 My investigative work undertaken between 1998 – 2004 concentrated on strategic aspects of the 
armed conflict using argumentation logic. The results identified discursive structures of a violent 
actor which were used to justify para-state acts.  Analytic instruments facilitated the study of 
ideological differences and the process of mutual learning adopted by both the guerrillas and the 
paramilitaries. A relatively original aspect in the methodology which was employed was the 
relationship between the discourse, ideology and the armed conflict in Colombia. Please see in 
particular: “La retórica del paramilitarismo”, in Revista Análisis Político, Instituto de Estudios 
Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales, IEPRI, Bogotá, Universidad Nacional de Colombia,  vol. 44, 
pp. 39 – 57, 2001; The book: Metáforas de una guerra perpetua, pragmática de la argumentación en 
el conflicto armado en Colombia, Fondo Editorial Universidad Eafit, Medellín, 2004, contains a good 
part of this period of investigation.  
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motivated by perverse collective and personal interests: first, the interests 
lie in the perks received by the informer; second, the interests relate to the 
strategy of terror which is used to intimidate victims and those who are 
close to them. 
The pieces of information that correlate with rumour are not always 
collected within completely structured conditions. What does that mean? As 
such, certain pieces of potentially key information are chosen and related to 
strategic points of the network that are in charge of reproducing information 
in adjacent areas. Así, un nodo que contiene potencialmente información 
clave puede relacionarse con puntos estratégicos en la red que se encargaría 
de reproducir la información en áreas adyacentes. Explain more. Out of a 
collection of known information, keys pieces are chosen and related to one 
another so as to justify strategy.  The direction that the information takes is 
not linear but follows capricious diversions. In other words, rumors are 
formed by interactive relationships and have evident faults: gaps in 
information, distortion and cases of individuals in a network behaving 
indifferently. This can be observed in the following diagram:  
 
 
 
 
Even more than investigating the relationship between information and 
rumour affected by the armed conflict, the aim of our research was to 
discover the conceptual structures that underlie conflict discourse.  Based 
on interviews and statements given by paramilitaries and insurgents 
(Carlos Castaño, Alfonso Cano, Comandante Gabino), reports and both 
printed and digital disclosed information, we were able to design 
Graphic 3. Adaptation of: Efficient 
adaptive dispensing, against omission 
failures, Darek Kowalski, Michałł 
Strojnowsk. The dispersion of rumour 
and information are found to determine 
efficient strategic nodes. However, 
communication faults can be observed 
in the gaps of information, effecting 
duration and efficiency, (Estrada, 
2007ª).  
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cartography for the metaphors and analogies employed by the violent actors. 
The research made use of Lakoff’s (1999) and Facounnier’s theories with 
application to the Colombian context5. 
 
 
HEURISTICS 
In the context of this nature is required to work on the subject with 
conceptual tools of greater density. Academic´s on the phenomena described 
are supplemented in our perspective with the following components: 
1. The idea of explaining the war in Colombia taking as basis the 
evolution and development of private protection agencies has been 
linked to the progressive generation of a potential market that starts 
with farmers and entrepreneurs in the Middle Magdalena and Puerto 
Boyaca, pervades the political geography of the Pacific Coast, between 
smugglers and local politicians in border areas, the corridors of Urabá 
from investments in oil palm cultivation, the departments of the 
South: Caquetá and Putumayo, with vast fields of coca, and extending 
into the areas north of Valle, Cauca and Nariño, triggering retaliation 
violent organization with a tradition since the '60s.6 
                                                          
5 Works: Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, "Metáforas del Poder Político", El Estado y la Fuerza: v.1 fasc.1 
p. - ,2001; Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, "La información y el rumor en zonas de conflicto: estrategias 
por el poder local en la confrontación armada en Colombia", Análisis Político v.- fasc.60 p.44 - 59 
,2007; Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, "Rumor e información. Estrategias por el poder local", Revista 
Semana pp.22 - 24 ,2006; Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, "El Lenguaje de la Guerra y la Política en 
Colombia", Reflexión Política, Universidad Autónoma de Bucaramanga, pp.71 - 79, 2000; Estrada, 
Gallego, Fernando, "Discursos de una Guerra Perpetua", Revista UIS Humanidades, v.31 fasc.2 p. - 
,2002; Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, "La Retórica del Paramilitarismo", Análisis Político, v.44 fasc. 
pp.39 - 57 ,2001; Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, "Metáforas del Discurso Político en Colombia", La 
Historia Contemporánea y las Ciencias Sociales, pp.198 - 220 ,2004; Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, Los 
nombres del Leviatán, Análisis de discursos de la Guerra en Colombia", Revista Semana; Estrada, 
Gallego, Fernando, Las metáforas de una guerra perpetua: análisis de la pragmática del discurso en el 
conflicto armado en Colombia, Fondo Universitario Editorial Eafit, v.1, 2004; Estrada, Gallego, 
Fernando, “Propagación del rumor y la información en las guerras civiles": III Simposio 
Internacional sobre analice do discurso, Universidad Federal de Mina Gerais , p.1 - 56 , v.III , 2008.    
6
 Ilustration done on the impact of clusters on the property and paramilitary land tenure, redistribution of 
resources by departmental and regional transfers: (Estrada, 2007, Valencia, León, 2009; Kalmanovitz, 
2001). Are not valued enough to have had the impact displacements stratification and population 
mobility. The social and economic costs of these phenomena: Estrada, Fernando, Alberto Castillo, 
Gonzalez, Jorge Ivan, La función Pública del Estado, Bogota, DANE Departamento de Estadística, 2008, 
Alejandro Reyes Posada, Guerreros y campesinos. El despojo de la tierra en Colombia, Bogotá, Editorial 
Norma, 2009. 
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2. Our research on private security agencies in emerging conflicts 
between their original sources is the work of Robert Nozick: Anarchy, 
State and Utopia (1974). The analytical merits of the concept are 
related Nozick be fully explained in the main components of private 
protection agencies in a market model7. Besides putting the strategic, 
conditions of the agencies within the evolutionary process of a 
political contract incomplete. The structure of competition for private 
protection in a society with irregular conflicts triggered an increasing 
spiral of further violence by their actors. The work we do has made 
progress in a complementary direction8. 
3. Another reference in the field of strategic games and logical behavior 
in irregular conflicts have been the work of Thomas Schelling: The 
Strategic of Conflict (1960) and Choise and Consecuence (1984). In 
both works we find ideas to understand the correlations between 
organized forms of crime with informal forms of the economy. A 
theory of indirect communication which plays a key role in cases such 
as threats and bribery. Successful coalitions between paramilitaries 
and drug cartels after 90, or links between smugglers and dealers 
insurgency (FARC, ELN) reflect aspects of organized crime on an 
original conflict between causal reasons. 
                                                          
7
 The phenomenon is only beginning to be explored in Colombia on systematization of national and 
international sources. With known as: CMSP, private military security companies. E, the topic of private 
protection agencies a la Nozick came into full force in Colombia. 
8
 Some publications of the author: Estrada, Gallego, Fernando, "¿A dónde ir?  Un análisis del 
desplazamiento forzado".  Análisis Político  Bogotá, Iepri, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, v.65 
pp.146 - 151, 2009. "Guerra Civil y Contractualismo Político Incompleto". Analítica Premium, 2008; 
"Estrategias por el poder local y conflicto Armado en Colombia".  Analítica Premium,  pp.17 - 25, 2007; 
"Estado Mínimo, Agencias de Protección y Control Territorial", Revista Análisis Político, Universidad 
Nacional de Colombia, v.56, pp.115 – 131, 2006; "El Escudo de Aquiles, Seguridad, Estado y Nuevas 
Guerras", Revista Semana/Editorial Planeta,  pp.124 - 156 , 2003; “El Soborno y la Amenaza en las 
Guerras Civiles", Primer Congreso de Ciencia Política, Bogotá, Universidad De Los Andes, 2008; 
"Agencias de Protección y Poder Político Local", Primer Congreso de Ciencia Política, Congreso de 
Ciencia Política Bogotá, Septiembre 30 - Octubre 4 de 2008; "Estrategia de Comunicación y 
Paramilitares en Colombia, Investigar la Comunicación Retos Científicos y Compromisos Sociales, 2007; 
"Concentración de Tierras y Desplazamiento Forzado en Colombia, Caso Antioquia", Dinámica del 
Conflicto Armado en el contexto de la política de Seguridad Democrática, Bogotá, Universidad 
Externado de Colombia, 2007; "Economía Política del Conflicto Armado en Colombia", XXII Congreso 
Nacional de Estudiantes de Economía, Bucaramanga, 2007; Análisis Actualizado del Conflicto Armado 
en Colombia", Mataron a Gaitán, Celebración 60 años, Bogotá, Universidad Nacional en Colombia, 
2008.  
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4. Research by Diego Gambetta on the Sicilian Mafia (2003) analytical 
framework partially meets Schelling / Nozick within targets relevant 
to the investigation of the Colombian case. We want to explore the 
direction taken by the work of Gambetta basically the following: (a) 
the idea of the protection industry as a potential markets, (b) provides 
comparative relationships between markets and market protection 
ordered disordered. The work we have elaborated on the information 
and rumor in conflict areas (Estrada, 2006), are complemented with 
the idea developed in the trademarks Gambetta and mechanisms of 
communication and information used by criminal organizations. 
A wide variety of prejudice has gained ground among proponent’s comments 
on links between clusters paramilitary and drug cartels [hypothesis (3), (5)]. 
A widely accepted belief is that the protection and security are marginal to 
the objectives of the armed conflict. This idea suggests a fragmented version 
of illegal markets in which each business unit operates independently of the 
others. The boss in the chain of the conflict only indirectly, since its 
objectives are focused on the delivery routes, money laundering or the 
business of smuggling at the borders. However, relations between the 
posters with the paramilitaries or between the cartels and the guerrillas, as 
well as the relationships they have minor criminal organizations with links 
in the chain, they agree on many goals9. 
In Gambetta (2003) the case of the Sicilian Mafia that private protection is 
a "central activity of a well-ordered mob. Those who receive protection may 
be fussy, but not usually considered useless, and many more times than you 
think in general, are actively seeking". This observation in the Colombian 
case is given the apparent objections lawlessness among emerging groups, 
but some disorder in the form of business does not mean that the ways in 
which security operates a business does not represent high profitability. In 
fact it is possible to verify how the conflict with struggles over the monopoly 
of illegal businesses in municipalities and regions. 
The reason´s for this confusion is related to studies that focus on aspects of 
the problem prone to spectacular. The categories and core concepts to define 
the conflict still within a sphere comprised of platitudes. We need to go far 
                                                          
9
 This hypothesis of correlations and shared interests between the paramilitary’s groups and State Robert 
Nozick expresses originality in works reviewed (Nozick, 1974). While it is important to note that the case 
studies, as in Colombia, offering obvious limitations. The change in policy or strategic positions taken by 
key actors, betrayal, money laundering, concealment of information, makes the trajectory of research in 
an open challenge to solve several problems: how to keep the illegal drug trade with agencies different?, 
Who assure safety on the routes of transmission of drugs?, how corrupt institutional representatives both 
within and outside the frontiers?, When coalitions are required and with whom?. 
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enough with less journalistic study structures. Another bias underlines the 
absence of armed conflict; some analysts invoke magic solution to this 
formula. "Organized Crime", "emerging bands," "guerrillas" or 
"paramilitaries" are used as denominators to describe in many cases the 
same thing. The basic problem is complicated by the difficult nature found 
in the sources. A variety of reason´s in the Colombian case requires a 
restructuring and work on materials that have been "kicked by the angels" 
(John L. Austin, Philosopher). 
There is first the need for a separate conceptual framework for agents, 
organizations, cartels, suppliers and buyers of protection. And recognize 
that in half a century of shared activities, paramilitary groups have 
managed to bring an illegal market has its own dynamics among large 
investors. How have they affected the regional circuits of the illegal market 
of the customs protection of each region in Colombia: mayors, city councils, 
legal trade? A proper understanding of these differences also reflects a 
fundamental issue of political economy: how they have incorporated the 
private protection and illegal markets to the general structure of formal 
economy in Colombia [Problems controvert the assumptions (1), (2), (3), (5)]. 
 
CRIMINALS BANDS  
The political disintegration of clusters paramilitaries is one of the most 
difficult to address. Should we say des-ideological? Take up arms against 
the state "? Or use the State to "fight those who oppose the State? This 
double movement triggers a misleading way of posing the problem. If 
politics is lost in the conflict, what are the reasons? It was argued by many 
analysts is that the drug trade and drug trafficking explain everything. 
Again, this means putting everything in one basket.  
And is it not so? The social have worked with differences? Mono-causal 
question is as flawed as its response, ceteris paribus, explanations that 
place within the same level: strategies, objectives, policy, armament. The 
need to differentiate and develop a reclassification (by regions, territories, 
incentives, resources and power), is essential. The changes provided in 
locations such as Puerto Boyacá Puerto Triunfo and after the paramilitary 
reintegration program are sufficient to understand that we were wrong to 
simplify the conflict and its resolution.  
Is it the rearmament of paramilitary? Pure drugs business? Who are their 
leaders less "spectacular"? Who pays? What area of political / military 
project? Questions whose require question´s of critical geography and logical 
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extension in the localities. The explanations are divided between those 
positions in emerging bands fragmented expression of common crime and 
organized crime, or who were concerned to rearm and consolidate in former 
territories of the paramilitaries. The picture is cloudy. The truth, however, 
is that the actions of urban crime in border towns and illegal businesses, 
they reveal a strategic expansion whose geography has not been studied yet.  
Part of conventional geography has been used in order to divert attention 
from critical areas of conflict. Exploit the fears and hostility feeds. 
Depending on the source providing the information is abused mapping to 
develop interpretations. A map is presented as reality; however, the maps 
are not reality. It is possible that further studies of critical geography teach 
us, by example, not only in what regions or areas of the country there is 
expansion of emerging bands, but to contribute to better define the 
dynamics of transition and learning the paramilitaries groups. If 
paramilitary gangs are emerging should be able to expose what updates or 
changes its projections territorial behavior and strategic10. 
The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of the 
paramilitaries, have you failed? Being negative response, what explains the 
return of member’s combatants to areas that were predominantly 
paramilitary? There are many concerns expressed serious institutional 
difficulties to handle a problem of dimensions that transcend the boundaries 
of government. However, in the Colombian case, the gaps in the program 
seem to respond to original conceptions of the process with severe 
limitations. Veterans do not surrender all their weapons. Businessmen, 
traders and, in general, economic sectors gave no support to the 
expectations of employment and occupation. And gradually the incentives of 
the program have been giving their way to new demands and proposals on 
the protection market. The negative influence of these factors, coupled with 
retaliation and crimes of ex-playing elements that deserve consideration.  
If government policy is to confuse emerging drug gangs, there are reasons to 
test their hypotheses. The emerging bands, it is claimed, do not have a 
counter-ideology that separates the paramilitaries. The paramilitary groups 
that were formed and evolved from Puerto Boyacá during the '80s, until the 
fronts of the Calima Bloc, dominant in the Pacific region, "were organized 
around a program counter? It is not clear. First, because their structures are 
                                                          
10
 A test that evaluates in an international context the emerging gang problem: Hoffman, Michael H., 
"Emerging combatants, war crimes and the Future of international humanitarian law", Crime, Law & 
Social Change 34: 99-110, 2000. The reflections are concerned with the need to distinguish combatants 
and to degrade and paramilitaries groups and design problems arising from limited categories of 
international humanitarian law, 
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not preserved uniformity of command (each front emerged and responded to 
specific demands of those who financed their creation). Second, its members 
did not share resources from a single supplier. Third, their statements and 
not ideologically conceived. The "paramilitary ideology" was really more an 
artifact11. 
Some works have explored the relationship between paramilitary groups 
and regional powers12. Documentation found in computer files and papers 
(bills, notes or receipts book) makes a clear influence on contracting 
mechanisms, and resource transfers and municipal departments. Injected 
capital flows to regional economies by drug traffickers were protected by the 
warlords13. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Far from being ordered in accordance with strategic plans of a single 
organization, emerging bands have become increasingly common, despite 
the hostility caused by the Uribe administration and the propaganda has 
proved devastatingly effective. The ideology that mobilizes its actions in 
regions such as Córdoba, Cauca, Valle, Nariño and La Guajira, not politics, 
not even be described as a counterinsurgency strategy, but rather a specific 
narrative of unmet basic needs. It is possible to believe that in conditions of 
desperate unemployment, for example, will become an effective policy14. 
                                                          
11
 Cubides, Fernando: Burocracias armadas, Bogotá, Norma, 2006. The rhetorical force that had 
insufficient paramilitary commanders (Carlos Castaño, Salvatore Mancuso and Jorge 40) to demonstrate 
the ideological program was offset by the academic services provided by some Argentines and 
Colombians. Cubides carried elements related to the analysis of this phenomenon. 
12
 León Valencia, Op. Cit.;  Alejandro Reyes Posada, Guerreros y campesinos. El despojo de la tierra en 
Colombia, Bogotá, Editorial Norma, 2009. 
13
 López, López, Andrés, El cartel de los sapos, la historia secreta de las mafias del narcotráfico más 
poderosas del mundo: el cartel del norte del valle, Bogotá, Planeta, 2008. 
14
 In the words of the same drug traffickers this seems like a fable, but they are common components of 
speaking about the reasons given by some groups to join paramilitary: "As the people remain child 
poverty, corruption, unemployment, lack of opportunity and is in the drug's only chance of escaping 
poverty, the tentacles of crime and drug contagion bacteria without remedy, "ibid., p. 311. As heroes, 
drug traffickers are presented in television series and media publishers. This is the case of Andrés López 
whose book: El cartel de los sapos, Bogotá, Norma, 2008, as a libretto adapted for television, has just 
won an honorable prize India Catalina in Cartagena, Colombia. 
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This interpretation of suffering violence will shake if focuses on a guilty (the 
State) which in turn can isolate the causes of violence casually addressing 
the problem. These narrative units are offered as a means of justifying 
causes quite far from their origins. The emerging bands, paramilitary, 
guerrilla and criminal organizations have enough speech in favor of its 
strategic objectives. If suffering is seen as natural or without cause shall be 
considered a misfortune instead of injustice and produce resignation rather 
than rebellion. Therefore, mafia, guerrillas or paramilitaries claimed its 
causes in speeches that seek to prosecute, rather than assuming the status 
of perpetrators.  
It happened with the FARC from its origins in Marquetalia, with the AUC 
of Magdalena Medio, with the MAS (Death to Kidnappers), with the 
paramilitaries in Cordoba and Antioquia Urabá, with paramilitaries under 
Ramon Isaza and the Black Eagles under the command of Don Mario, every 
one of the main actors of the conflict is delivered to a discourse of guilt. 
Interpret the actions of their enemies as crimes, inserting an all-
encompassing discourse on monstrosity of his actions. Outreach campaigns 
and territorial dominance, population displacement and destruction in the 
regions should be observed also by creating a myth that will help sustain 
the conspiracy.  
Demonizing its enemies and responsible for the atrocities of the war not 
only helped to neutralize the scruples to kill peasants and Indians 
("guerrillas dressed in civilian clothes," said Jorge 40 and Carlos Castaño). 
He allegedly also helped intensify recruitment for their cause. If the regions 
where groups did not operate in a limited way-or-with a legitimate presence 
of state agencies, the opportunity was unique to invoke the need for his 
presence, and the discipline imposed on populations. The enemy was seen as 
a destroyer of peaceful coexistence, the state as indifferent and insulated to 
the center. This was the condensation of their ideology. But the causes 
alleged hidden interest in the discourse of higher crime and criminal scope.  
The ideology had abdicated her political identity. Shares of emerging bands 
seem to be defined instrumentally by the drug economy and the dominance 
of strategic geography. The recruitment of youth and adolescents preferably 
made in depressed areas of Bogota, Medellin, Cali, Bucaramanga and 
Barranquilla, basically show that the conviction is not doctrinaire. For some 
emerging rescue their unemployment and poverty, incorporating the main 
workforce at little risk. We have passed since the violence of the 60s classic, 
low imperatives disguised by the discourse of the Cold War, into a product of 
the first decade of the century, where conflicts of interest between groups 
paramilitaries, is reduced to the drug markets and drug trafficking.  
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What we sought in this review of research on the conflict in Colombia is to 
hire our work with some of the assumptions most influential among the 
public. In no way were completed articles or books released in the last 
decade, nor in his fullness we have examined the authors dealing with 
conflict. The hypothesis we have proposed as predominant versions, have 
been outlined leaving out details that do not affect the whole. In the 
introduction we said that these are not caricatures, but strongly held belief 
among those who put their theories about the Colombian conflict. 
We show, contrary to the hypothesis, which indeed we have reason to be 
wary of rumors about the end of armed conflict and the final dismantling of 
paramilitary groups. The facts of war are striking and show us that the 
FARC, though diminished in their action, remain structurally intact. And 
the paramilitaries were able to sell at a relatively low price the idea of 
reintegration, in fact, maintained camps Vicente Castaño and rear with new 
heads of emerging bands (Don Mario, stubble). The armed conflict in 
Colombia has taken on new faces, like Clausewitz's metaphor  
An explanation of the armed conflict has been complemented in our 
approach from a theory of the Schelling strategy / Nozick. We believe that 
addressing the conflict from the strategies and territorial geography 
promises less simple observations. New wars do not necessarily mean 
radical breaks with the strategy of violent actors of the 60s, but no doubt 
that incorporate aspects such as drug trafficking and smuggling, are 
variables whose explanation is more complex. Game theory and asymmetric 
information and discourse analysis contribute substantially to improved 
research methods.  
There are sufficient aspects of analogy. Analyst in the strategy and 
operations of guerrillas and paramilitaries, have suggested that the 
Colombian conflict analysis should show the differences between clusters 
paramilitary. Not only because after the 80s, drug trafficking has played a 
decisive role, but because the geography of territories and control 
combinations have not been studied sufficiently. Geography of armed 
conflict should also provide tools to understand the impact of war on natural 
resources, for example.  
Finally, we sustain that while the drug economy has filtered the structure of 
semi-groups, promoting market competition and private security protection, 
drug trafficking does not explain absolutely all sources of violence in 
Colombia. The strategy of armed conflict has its main actors incentives are 
deeply rooted in unequal economic relations. There differences between 
regions in the center and the periphery of the Colombia and asymmetrical 
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forms of development, poverty, unemployment and corruption. These are 
variables in which the drug is not directly involved but are part of historical 
attitudes that require our analysis. 
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